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VENDEE'S REMEDIES FOR VENDOR'S NONCONVEYANCE.
With respect to the right of the vendee to specific performance, the distinction between written and oral contracts is made
vital by the statute of frauds and perjuries. Specifically to enforce an oral contract would be to annul that statute. Nor could
it be material whether the enforcement was by a decree in equity
with the risk of punishment as for contempt, upon disobedience,
or by a verdict and judgment for a sum of money made so large
as probably to constrain the vendor into making the conveyance.
The use of the action of covenant, or assumpsit' for the purpose,
was formerly not infrequent. "With us," said Gibson C. J. in
1836, "it (covenant) is often used as an instrument of specific
execution by means of a conditional verdict."'2 Ejectment may
likewise be employed by the vendee.'
When the vendee's remedy is for damages, the distinction
between written and parol contracts loses its importance, although
frequently the courts, in laying down the rule for the measure
of damages, in cases in which the contract was in fact oral, advert to that circumstance as if it were influential. A consecutive
study of the cases will reveal no difference of measure of damages,
depending upon the oral or scriptory nature of the contract.
Can the vendee under a written contract or oral recover, as
damages, the loss of the bargain, that is, the difference between
the price that he agreed to pay for the land, and its greater actual
market value?4 If A having made a contract to convey, has
'Irvine v. Bull, 7 W. 323. Cf, Naftzinger v. Roth, 93, Pa. 443.
2Stevenson v. Kleppinger, 5W. 420.
329 P. and L. Dig., Dec. 33o65 et. seq.
4
In Hertzog v. Hertzog, 34 Pa. 418, it is said that to allow the vendee
to recover the value of the land less the purchase money not yet paid by
him, if any, would be specifically to enforce the contract, and that would

violate the statute of frauds; but this principle has not been extended to
actions by the vendor, in which he has been allowed to recover the difference between the value of the land and the contract price.
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actually conveyed with warranty, and the vendee has subsequently been evicted under a better title, it is well settled that all
that he can recover upon his covenant is, not the value of the
land at the time of the eviction, or at the time of the conveyance
or at the time of the making of the contract to convey, but the
amount of purchase money paid by him with interest. But, to
allow for the vendor's refusal to convey at all, larger damages
than would be allowed, had he conveyed, and had the vendee
lost the land under a superior claim, would be a solecism. Accordingly, the vendee is never allowed damages for the loss of
his bargain', where the vendor has not been guilty of fraud. As
the statute of frauds has not been held an obstacle to a vendor's
recovering damages for the loss of his bargain, it could not well
prevent the vendee's recovering for the same. If, the parol vendor
retaining the land, he may get the money equivalent of what he
would have made had the vendee accepted the conveyance, why
should the vendee not be allowed, despite the statute, to recover
the equivalent of what he would have gained, had the vendor
duly performed?
It is not logically necessary to assimilate the case of a vendor
who is unable to fulfill his contract, to convey, or who, having
conveyed, has without fraud not conveyed a perfect title, with
the case in which the vendor simply declines or omits to carry
out a contract which be might, if he would, perform. If the con-.
tract is in writing, and the court will specifically enforce it, by
bill in equity, or by ejectment, or otherwise, it is difficult to see
why, if the vendee is willing to take money instead of the land,
he should not be allowed to proceed for damages which shall be
equal to the worth of the land for which they are the substitute.
In Bitner v. Brough the contract was written. It might have
been specifically enforced but for the fact that the vendor's wife
declined to unite in the conveyance. But, if this refusal was
the result of the vendor's persuasion, it was held that the vendee
'McNair v. Compton, 35 Pa. 23. This was a parol contract. So was
that of Hertzog v. Hertzog, 34 Pa. 418; Dumars v. Miller, 34 Pa. 319; Ballas
v. Wolff, IT Sup. 15o; Ruckert v. Domenec, 2 W. N. C. 195. Sharswood, J.,
in Bowser v. Cessna, 62 Pa. 148. stating the rule that the vendee can not recover for the loss of his bargain says, referring to Dumars v. Miller, "but
that is not because the agreement is by parol. The same rule applies to
written contracts and depends upon different principles." Nearly every case
cited in this article, however was in fact an oral contract, or was treated as
such. Bitner v. Brough, ii Pa., 127 was a written contract.
2ix Pa. 127; Burk v. Serrill, 8o Pa. 413.
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might recover for the loss of the bargain. "A party, says the
court, must not be allowed to gain by a violation of his engagement." It may perhaps be safely affirmed, that when the contract, being written, is specifically enforceable, its breach will, at
his option, entitle the vendee, as damages, to the value of the
land, less what he would, under the contract, have been obliged
to pay for it, that is, for the loss of the bargain. When without
excuse, and merely to avoid the results of a bad bargain, the
vendor declines to carry out a contract which has been put into
the form required by law to make it etiforceable, the vendee will
be "entitled not oly to compensatory damages, but to damages
arising from the loss of the bargain, or the money which he
would have derived from the completion of the contract." 2 When
the wife refuses to execute a conveyance without the fraudulent
inducement of the husband, the vendee can neither specifically
enforce the contract, nor cau he recover as damages the value
of the bargain.' To allow him to recover for the loss of the bargain, it is said, would be to coerce the wife into executing the
He may recover however, whatever money he has
conveyance.'
paid on the footing of the contract, with interest, and legitimate
expenses incurred in expectation of the conveyance.'
What then may the vendee recover? He may have paid to
the vendor all or some of the purchase money. This, incontest2Bartram v. Hering, i8 Super. 395. In Hennershotz v. Gallagher, 124.
Pa. i, it was assumed that the vendee would be entitled to the difference between the actual value of the land at the time the conveyance is to be madeand the price which he had agreed to pay. An unsuccessful effort was
made to show that there was a difference and what it was. In Kaufmann
v. Kirker, 22 Sup. 20, where the vendee in awwritten contract refused to
perform, the vendor sought a specific performance, but his bill was dismissed
because there had been a mutual mistake as to the quantity of land underlaid with coal. The vendee then sued for damages, not claiming for the
loss of the bargain, but for costs, fees, expenses, joss of time and labor.
He recovered $40 paid for an abstract of title, $ioo for fees for passing on
a certified title; and $25 for cost of surveys. He was allowed to recover for
counsel fees in defending the suit for specific performance. In Ballas v.
Wolff, IT Sup. 5o the contract was oral, but the vendee had gone into possession, making improvements so that he was entitled to specific performance. It was said that he could not recover for the loss of the bargain.
3Huffman v. Bradshaw, 17 Sup. 203; Burke v. Serrill, So Pa. 413; Hill v.
Jones, 152 Pa. 433.
4
Burk v. Serrill, So Pa. 4,3.
5Burk v. Serrill, So Pa. 43; Huffman v. Bradshaw, 17 Sup. 205.
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ably, would be damages or a portion of them, which he would
have suffered by the vendor's failure to make the conveyance.
He can recover it back'. The right of the vendee to recover
what he has paid does not defend on the contract's being specificially and definitely proved.'
The vendee who has paid all or some of the purchase money,
will be entitled to interest upon it from the time of the vendor's
default,' unless having been in possession of the land, the value
to him of this possession is equivalent to it. If the title of the
vendor was bad, so that the vendee may be liable for mesne
profits, the value of the possession for such time as is within six
years prior to the action therefor by the owner of the paramount
title, will not be set off against the interest to which he will be
entitled.'
The consideration furnished by the vendee, may have consisted in something else than money. .-The contract, e. g. between
A and B may have been for an exchange of lands, and B may
have conveyed his land to A. B can recover from A, on his
failure to convey to B the value of this land in money.' Interest
upon this value from the time when A ought to have clnveyed
must also be allowed. 6
The consideration furnished by the vendee, sometimes consists of services of various sorts; e. g., services of a housekeeper
and nurse,' farming A's land for him, and attending generally
to A's business as long as he lived, 8 maintaining A during his
lifetime.9 In several cases" it had been held, though the con'Bitner v. Brough, ii Pa. 127; Dumars v. Miller, 34 Pa. 319 (oral)
Harris v. Harris, 70 Pa. 170 (oral) Hughes v. Heintzleman, 2 Walk. 426
(oral).
2Milligan v. Dick, 107 Pa. 259. Oral contract whose terms were indistinct.
3Bitner v. Brough, ii Pa. I'i7; Dumars v. Miller 34 Pa. 319; Harris v
Harris, 70 Pa. 170.
4Cox v. Henry, 32 Pa. z8.
5Zimmerman
v. Galbraith, 4 Penny. 297; Burr v. Todd, 41 Pa. 2o6.
6
Zimmerman v. Galbraith, 4 Penny. 297.
7Malaun v. Ammon, i Gr. 123; Jack v. McKee, 9 Pa. 235; Graham v.
Graham, 34 Pa. 475; Ewing v. Thompson, 66 Pa. 382.
"McDowell
v. Oyer, 21 Pa. 417 ;Bash v. Bash, 9 Pa. 26o.
9
Bender v. Bender, 37 Pa. 419.
0
' jack v. McKee, 9 Pa. 235; Bash v. Bash, 9 Pa. 26o; Oyer v. McDowell,
21 Pa. 417; Malaun v. Ammon, i Gr. 123. In Burr v. Todd, 41 Pa. 2o6, A

having conveyed land to B as the consideration for a conveyance by B of
other land to A, and B having refused to convey, the value of the land
which B ought to have conveyed, at the time when he ought to have conveyed it, was said to be the measure of A's damages, but Woodward, J.,
added that the value of the land A was to receive was to be taken as equal
to the value of that which he gave. The contract was written.
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tracts were oral, that the measure of damages in such cases was
the value of the land which ought to have been conveyed or devised. In Jack v. McKee' where the plaintiff alleged a contract
with X for domestic services to X, who engaged to give her a
piece of land at his death, Rogers J. parried the statute of frauds
by saying "The statute of frauds only applies to a contract for
the sale of land. But was this a contract for the sale of land?
It is a contract for services to be paid in land, but not a contract
for the sale of land. * * * What then is the measure of damages? To this we answer, the value of the land, because that is
carrying out in good faith the contract of the parties. * * *
He cannot, it is true, be compelled to convey the land for two
reasons: first, because this is not a sale of land; and secondly, because, if it were, the contract is by parol. * * * Jack knew
better than any other human being could know, the real nature
and value of the services she was expected to perform; and if
she has performed them in good faith, and so the jury have
found, why should she not be allowed compensation according to
the price estimated by themselves?" At length, in Hertzog v.
Hertzog it was held that for the owner's breach of his contract to
devise or convey, in consideration of services, the damages recoverable, are not the value of the land, but the value of the ser
vices rendered in reliance on the contract. In Sands v. Arthur,
B was working for A. A orally agreed to convey to him a piece
of land, the price of which was to be set off against the wages.
A declining to convey, B could recover, not the value of the land
but only of his services.
The consideration may consist in whole or in part of articles
of food, clothing, etc., of shelter, to be furnished by a son to his
father, on the father's orally promising to devise a piece of land
to him. Should the father fail to devise, the son may recover the
money value of the maintenance furnished.'
'9 Pa. 235.

In Rohr v. Kindt, 3 W. & S. 563, A having induced B to

withdraw a caveat against the probate of a will by orally promising to convey to B a house, it was held that on A's refusal to perform, B could recover the value of the house.
234 Pa. 48, Graham v. Graham, 34 Pa. 475. The plaintiff having paid
some money also, he was allowed to recover it with interest from the death
of the deceased, who had failed, as he had promised, to devise the land,
But why was interest not allowed from the time'of the payments? Cf.
Ewing v. Thompson, 66 Pa. 382; Hastings v. Eckley, 8 Pa. i94; Tyson v.
Eyrick, 141 Pa. 296.
384 Pa. 479.
4Bender v. Bender, 37 Pa. 419.
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As the vendee may assume that the vendor is going to perform the contract, although, especially if it is oral, he may refuse, whatever reasonable expenditures may be made by the
vendee in consequence of the vendor's expected performance, he
may recover, should the vendor subsequently omit to perform.
The vendee, in reliance on the vendor's performance, sells his own
farm in Adams County in order to raise the purchase money; arranges to remove to Franklin County, where the purchased farm
lies, and actually removes with his family and stock. For the
trouble and expense thus incurred, doubtless, the vendee must
be compensated, no less than for the purchase money he has
paid.' He must also be paid, it is said, for what he has expended
by way of investigating' or obtaining the title, plus interest thereon, 3 and for the cost of a survey.' If he has hauled manure on
the premises, expecting to occupy them, he is entitled to the
value of this manure.5 If the consideration for A's conveyance
to B, is a conveyance from B to A, of another piece of land,
which B is to have recorded, the cost of this deed and of the recording of it, added to the value of the house, will be the damages. 6
The vendee, in expectation of a conveyance to him, having
taken possession of the laud, may make improvements upon it, of
which lie will be deprived if the land shall not be conveyed to
him. He may, besides any purchase money paid by him, recover
compensation for clearing, fencing, building, planting orchards,
in reliance on the contract.'
"The making of improvements
seems to us," says Lowrie, C. J., "a natural consequence of relying on the contract; and the party [vendor] who witnesses the
making of them without objection, and then rescinds the contract,
ought to pay for them." '
When however the vendor notifies
the vendee that he cannot,' or will not"0 carry out his parol con'Bitner v. Brough, ii Pa. 127. Cf. Sands v. Arthur, 84 Pa. 479.
2Lee v. Dean, 3 Wh. 36; Eberz v. Heiser, 12 Sup. 388.
3Dumars v. Miller, 34 Pa. 319.
4Holthouse v. Rynd, 155 Pa. 43.
5
Zimmerman v. Galbraith,4 Penny. 297. Holthouse v. Rynd, 155 Pa. 43.
6
Hughes v. Heintzleman, 2 Walk. 426. In order to escape paying for
the house, the vendor would need to cancel the deed, or reconvey the land,
or otherwise put it into the control of the vendee.
'Harris v Harris, 70 P4. 17o.
$Bender v. Bender, 37 Pa. 419. Compensation was recoverable for the
cost of a cellar made by the vendee. Holthouse v. Rynd, i55 Pa. 43.
9Holthouse v. Rynd, 15SPa. 43.
'0Bitner v. Brough, is Pa. 127.
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tract to convey the land, the latter cannot charge the cost of any
subsequent improvements upon the former. The notice once
given might of course, be withdrawn, or the vendor by word or
act might induce the vendee to think it withdrawn. He could
then act as if it had never been given. If the vendor does not
refuse to convey, so far as he can, in accordance with the contract, but, because he has made a mistake as to the position of
one of his lines, the true place of which lie subsequently discovers, can convey a piece of land which in width is one foot less
than the piece which he contracted to convey, the principle that
prevents a recovery of more than a proportional part of the purchase money on a breach of a warranty applies. In Tyson v.
Eyrick,' A contracted to sell to B a piece of land 50 by 100 feet,
and indicated the lines. After B had taken possession, done some
work preparatory to the erection of a double brick house, and
built the foundation walls, it i as discovered that one foot of the
lot along the south side did not belong to the vendor. B nevertheless completed his house. It was held that he was entitled
to recover only one-fiftieth of the contract price of the lot, since
he had failed to obtain but one-fiftieth of the land, and there
was no evidence that that fiftieth was of more value than any
other fiftieth. "He cannot be allowed damages," said Clark, J.,
"for the misplacement of his building; it was his duty, before expending his money upon valuable improvements, to ascertain
and know his lines, and to locate his buildings accordingly!
* * * * It seems hard that a purchaser, acting in good
faith, should lose his improvements; it is equally hard that a vendor, also acting in good faith, should have to pay for them."
The right of the vendee to recover the value of the improvements put on the land, results from his being deprived of the
possession of the land. If he continues in the uninterrupted enjoyment of the land and of the improvements as fully as the contract stipulated, he cannot recover damages for the cost of the
latter' and from the damages consisting of purchase money paid,
141 Pa. 296. Cf. Beaupland v. McKean, 28 Pa. 124, where the doctrine
of proportional abatement from the price for a loss of title to a portion of
the land, after conveyance, is applied. No allowance was made for additional expense in improving the part the title to which was good.
2
But he had inquired of the vendor, who by his agent, had misinformed
him.
3
Noftzinger v. Roth, 93 Pa. 443.
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improvements made, and other expenses incurred, would have to
be deducted a fair rental for the premises during the occupancy
of the vendee.'
We have seen that the disappointed vendee can ordinarily
recover nothing for the loss of the bargain.' Fraud however, on
the part of the vendor is said to confer on the vendee, even under
an oral "contract,' the right to recover compensation
for this loss. The fraud must exist at the inception of the
contract.' A refusal to carry it out, from whatever motive,5 e. g.
because the vendor has discovered that he can obtain a better
price' and the fact that the land has increased in value since the
contract was made' is not such fraud. The statute of frauds
allows a man to refuse to perform an oral contract to convey, but
if he could be compelled to compensate the vendee for the loss of
the bargain, he could virtually be compelled to perform the contract.8 It is not correct therefore, to say to the jury that if the
vendor has acted in "bad faith" towards the vendee, the latter
may recover the value of the land less what he owes for the purchase money, because the refusal to convey, when the vendor
had the power, would be "bad faith." 9
If the vendor has the intent to defraud, when he makes the
contract, intends to betray the vendee into losses, into paying
the purchase money without obtaining an equivalent, there
would be fraud that would expose him to the duty of compensating the parol vendee for the loss of the bargain." In Thompson
v. Sheplar" it appeared that, A's property being about to be sold
in execution, Thompson agreed with him to buy the property,
and allow A to redeem it within twelve months, by paying to
Thompson what he should pay with ten per cent interest; that
'Harris v. Harris, 70 Pa. 17o; Bender v. Bender, 37 Pa. 419.
2
Ballas v. Wolff, iiSup. 15o.
3
Eberz v. Heisler, Y2 Sup. 388; Carner v. Peters, 9 Sup. 29.
'McNair v. Compton, 35 Pa. 23. Thompson v. Sheplar, 72 Pa. i6o;
Hughes v. Heintzleman, 2 Walk. 426; Rineer v. Collins, 156 Pa. 342.
6Walter v. Transue, 17 Sup. 94; Rineer v. Collins, i56 Pa. 342; Harris
V. Harris. 70 Pa. 17o; Thompson v. Sheplar, 72 Pa. 16o.
6
Rineer v. Collins, 156 Pa. 342; Harris v. Harris, 70 Pa.'170.

'Ruckert v. Domenec, 2 W. N. C. x95:
sRineer v. Collins, 156 Pa. 342.
'Harris v. Harris, 70 Pa. 170.
'0McNair v. Compton, 35 Pa. 23.
1172 Pa. 16o. Cf. Meason v. Kaine, 67 Pa. 126.
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Thompson thus obtained the property for $2500 although another
who was at the sale, but for the arrangement would have paid
S3500, and other persons would have stopped the sale but
for Thompson's promise. Although there was no evidence that
Thompson did not intend, when he purchased, to keep his promise,
Williams, J., thinks that "There was abundant evidence, if believed, to justify the jury in finding that Thompson was a trustee
ex malefcio; and, if so, the plaintiff was entitled to recover as
damages the difference between the amount of the tender [$2500
plus ten per cent interest] and the actual value of the land at that
date."
On the other hand, when B, having bought land at a judicial
sale for a certain price, caused the return to be made as of a sale
to A, who had orally agreed to convey the land to B, upon B's
repaying to him the purchase money, B could recover as damages
only what he had paid-in this case, nothing-or what he had
expended in reliance on the contract. He could not recover the
difference between what A pald for the land and what it was
really worth.'
Whenever a contract has been made which is not voidable
for fraud, mistake, or other cause, the breach of it by the vendor
will in every case entitle the vendee at least to nominal damages.
If he has paid no purchase money, and made no expenditures,
jn reliance on the parol contract, he can recover no more than
nominal damages,' nor, unless he shows what actual damage he
has suffered.' A son to whom his father has orally promised to
Lee v. Dean, 3 Wh. 316. With this may be compared King v. Pyle, 8
S. & R. x66, where A inducing B to accept a conveyance by the statement
known by him to be false that the land to be conveyed embraced certain six
acres of woodland it was held that B could deduct from the purchase
money, not merely a proportion of the purchase money, but the actual
value of the woodland.
'Swayne N. Swayne, i9. Super. x6o. A conveys to B land for a certain
price, viz. a debt owed to B. B orally agrees to sell the property at any
time within five years, and, if more than the debt and interest is made to
pay the excess to A. A can probably recover the difference. If A gives
notice to B to sell, on a certain day, but B has already sold. B will not be
liable to account for more than the price obtained, if having retained the
land and sold it in accordance with the notice, he would have obtained no
more; Means v. Milliken, 33 Pa. 51.7.
2Rineer v. Collins, 156 Pa. 342; Thompson v. Sheplar, 72 Pa. x6o; Sausser
v. Steinmetz, 88 Pa., 324; McCafferty v. Griswold, 99 Pa. 27o; Ebers v.
Heisler, 12 Sup. 388.
3Burrv. Todd, 41 Pa. 2o6.
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devise a farm, may recover nominal damages, though he fails to
show what was the value of the services rendered by him.4 A
having conveyed land to B under articles stipulating that the
land was clear of incumbrances, and B having taken possession
and paid the purchase money, ten years later B brings an action
for damages, because the land was charged with a recognizance
given in the orphan's court. At the time of the trial, but not of
the inception of the action, the recognizance was presumed to be
paid from the lapse of time. B was entitled to nominal damages.5
The nominal damages may be six cents or other small sum. In
a suit by the vendee for the vendor's failure to convey, Biddle,
J., told the jury that,'in the absence of evidence of damages, they
might allow fifty cents or one dollar. The verdict was for 50
cents.6 The right to nominal damages, e. g. from vendor's refusing to furnish the vendee with an abstract of title according
to the contract as a means of assisting the vendee to decide
whether to exercise affirmatively his option to take the land, is
not lost, although the conduct of the vendee on his refusal, justifies
the vendor in thinking that the vendee will no longer insist on
his right to require a conveyance of the land, and precltfdes the
latter from recovering damages more than nominal.'
A buyer's option is a contract. It may stipulate for the furnishing to the purchaser of it, an abstract of title as a means of
assisting him to a decision whether to take the land. If on the
vendee's demand, this brief is not given, he has a right to damages, at least nominal.'
Possibly if he was able and willing to
accept the land, on the exhibition of the facts concerning the
title which the abstract would have displayed, he would be entitled to the same damages as if the contract, instead of one for
an option, had been for the unconditional conveyance of the
land. The vendee being in possession, the mere omission of the
vendor to make a deed to him does not warrant the recovery as
damages of what he may have spent upon a house, or of such
part of the purchase money as he may have paid, nor, would the
making of a deed to a purchaser at sheriff's sale of the vendee's
interest.9 If the vendor's failure to put on record a power of attorney, as he has contracted to do, prevents the vendee's re4Bash v. Bash, 9 Pa. 26o
5
Allen v. Sawyer, 2 P. and W. 325.
6
Hennershotz v. Gallagher, 124 Pa. i.
7
Emery v. Regester, 17 Super. 482.
8
Emery v. Regester, 17 Sup. 482.
9
Ballas v. Wolff, ix Sup. 150.
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covering from certain trespassers because of his inability to
prove his title, he will be entitled to a deduction of the damages
from the purchase money. 3
It has been said that when a vendee sues upon an oral contract he must prove that it was made and what its terms were.
Otherwise he cannot recover as damages for the alleged breach,
anything else than the purchase money he may have paid upon
it,' but if he shows that there was a contract, and enough of its
terms to make clear that the vendor has broken it, he may recover
back what purchase money he has paid in reliance on it. "It is
no defence that the terms of the contract were not specific and
definite." 5 The fact that the contract, being parol, cannot be
specifically enforced does not prevent a recovery of damages.'
The vendee's being in possession, his right to the specific
performance of the contract, or to damages for the vendor's nonconveyance, will pass to one who pnrchases his interest by negotiation with him7 or at a sheriff's sale of it. Hence after such
sale, he will not be entitled to damages for the vendor's refusal
to convey to him.'
The contract of sale may have been induced by the fraud of
the vendee. The vendor may for this cause, refuse to perforrii,
without making himself liable for damages, on his return of the
consideration.9 If fraud has induced the vendee to enter into
the contract, he may rescind, and recover the money paid by
him with interest" except for the time he may have been in posession of the premises" and any special expenses to which he has
been put in making the purchase. The inability of the vendor to
3

Penn v. Preston, 2 R. 14.
'Walter v. Transue, 17 Sup. 94.
v. Dick, 1o7 Pa. 259.
Poorman v. Kilgore, 37 Pa. 309.
T
Emery v. Regester, 17 Sup. 482.
8
Ballas v. Wolff, ii Sup. i5o. A, having orally contracted to sell land
to B, B took possession and built a house. It was destroyed by fire. He
built a second house. He paid to an absconding contractor $5oo. He had
paid $25 on the purchase money. The cost of the first house exceeded the
insurance money by $25o. B's interest having pass-d to a purchaser at
sheriff's sale, to whom A made the conveyance, B could recover none of
these sums.
9
Burr v. Todd, 41 Pa. 2o6. An exchange of lands between A and B.
After A had conveyed to B, B discovered fraud on A's part and thereupon
tendered a reconveyance. A could recover no damages. (Implied).
"Cooper v. Bushley, 72 Pa. 252; Ebertz v. Heisler, 12 Sup. 388.
'Stevenson v. Klippinger, 5 W. 420.
5
Milligan
6

182
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convey a title clear of encumbrances may justify rescission, and
the recovery of purchase money paid, and the cost of searches
and the drawing up of a deed.'
A by written contract sold to B a lot, for which B at once
paid the price. A was to execute a deed on the 1st day of Nov.,
1853. The lot was unimproved, and B did not take possession.
He paid the taxes for 1854, and promised the collector to pay
them in 1855. He never demanded a deed, but on Jan. 22d,
1856, brought an action against A for damages. Eleven days
afterwards, A tendered a deed, and a release from a pre-existing
mortgage, and the costs already incurred in the suit. B declined
to accept them. It Was held that strictly, the covenant was
broken with the non-delivery of the deed before or on Nov. 1st,
1853, but equity allows A still to perform on compensating B
for his negligence, when there has been no serious change of circumstances, and when B has not. seriously urged performance.
B was entitled Prina fade at least to the interest on his payment
from Nov. 1st, 1853, until the tender of performance. To reduce this amount, A would have to show that B had riot suffered
that amount of injury. But B could not recover compensation
for the fee of counsel whom he has employed in the suit.' For
the failure of the vendor to deliver possession at the time named
in the contract, the damage is the rent or profit the vendee might
have derived, from the premises during the time during which he
was improperly deprived of the possession. It would be improper
to allow the venaee to show that he had made a contract with X
that X should take out coal sufficient to pay him $1,000 at the
rate of one-fourth of a cent a bushel, and that this contract fell
through because he was unable to give X possession in order that
he might recover this $1,000 as damages.'
If the vendor has orally warranted that the land contains
more growing timber than it does, and that the water power of
the saw-mill upon it is greater than it is, the vendee may deduct
the value of the timber that'ought to have been, but is not, on the
premises, and the difference between the value of a mill, as it
was represented to be and of the actual mill, the mill not being
so situated that it could be rented as a custom mill, and not being
'Ebertz v. Heisler

12 Sup. 388.
v. Erie Gas Co. 29 Pa. 254.
3Gilmore v. Hunt, 66 Pa. 32t. There was no evidence that the vendee
had been compelled to pay X anything nor that the coal not taken out by
.Xwas worth any less at the time of trial than the price X had agreed to
pay for it.
2Haverstick
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susceptible of being made to fulfil the warranty, by repair or reconstruction.'
Principles similar to those applicable to contrcts for the sale
of land, are applicable to contracts to let land for a term of years.
If a lease in writing were in fact made, for a period exceeding
three years, and the lessee failed to have the benefit of it, without fault of the lessor because of a defect in the lessor's title, if,
e. g. the lessor was merely a life-tenant, and he died before the
completion of the term, the measure of damages would be the
purchase money of the lease, as, on a covenant of warranty, only
the purchase money or a proportional part of it can be recovered.
A forliori, if the life-tenant dies before the time arrives for him
to execute the lease, but after orally contracting to make it, the
other party cannot recover the value of the lease, that is, the
difference between the value of the term and the amount of rent
that it would have been necessary to pay under the lease., But,
having paid money in order to extinguish an outstanding lease
in another, in expectation that the promised lease would be
made, he may recover what he has thus paid.1 He could not
have recovered more, says the supreme court, if the lease contracted for had actually been executed, and the lessee had afterwards been evicted by the remaindermen, after the death of the
tenant for life. A orally agrees to make a lease for twenty
years to B of a tract of oil land, 10 acres in size. B takes pos§ession, and drills a well on one part of the tract. The written
lease is then executed, but A refuses to embrace in it more than
five acres. B subsequently sells his leasehold in the five acres
and clears $8,000. His demand for a lease for the other five
acres, is refused. He is entitled only to nominal damages,
having made no expenditures upon these five acres, nor paid anything for a lease thereof. To his suggestion that he would not
have sunk the well on the other five acre piece had he not expected the second five acres, the answer is that he has thereby
made a profit of $8,000.2
In Walter v. Transue an action for damages for eviction
from the leased premises, Walter alleged an oral lease for five
0

Walker v. France, in2 Pa. 203.

'McClowry v. Croghan, 31 Pa.

22. The amount recovered was $36.
The value of the lease, ascertained to be $54o , was not allowed.
2
McCafferty v. Griswold, 99 Pa. 270.
s17 Sup. 94.

THE FORUM
years of a brickyard, of which the rent, for the first year was
$50, and thereafter a royalty of 25 cents per thousand of marketable bricks manufactured, was to be paid. Walter entered and
erected a brick kiln, and graded the ground to make it level.
Having enjoyed the possession for one year and eleven months,
he was evicted. He claimed and in the court below was allowed
as damages, the increase to the value of the premises caused by
his improvement. On appeal it was apparently held that he was
entitled to the value of the material of the kiln when removed
less the cost of removing it, and, (as he had already occupied
the premises two out of. five years, and thus obtained two-fifths
of the use that he expected to get of the improvements), to threefifths of the remainder of the cost of the improvement, after deducting the value of the material, less the cost of taking it away.
The value of the material being supposed to be $200, and the cost
of the improvement having been $1,000, the lessee would be entitled to the $200 filus three-fifths of $800.1
'Rice, P. J., and W. W. Porter, J., took a different view. Walter was
a tenant from year to year. He was evicted before the end of the second
year by Transue's tortious act. Transue ought then to pay for the enhance-.
meat of the value of the premises by Walter's expenditures. Or he
should pay for the value of the kiln in place.
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MOOT COURT
HALL vs. UNDERWOODPromissory Note-Accommodation Endorser-Agency Ratification.
STATEMENT OF CASE.
One Shoemaker representing that he had been authorized by Underwood to sign Underwood's name as an accommodation indorser upon a
note drawn payable to Underwood by Rhone, did so sign Underwood's
name. Hall then discounted the note for Rhone. Rhone failing to pay
on maturity of note, Hall called on Underwood to pay, Underwood replied
that he had never authorized the use of his name but that he would pay
the note within a week. After a month, Hall called upon Underwood
again, but latter replied that he had changed his mind and would not
pay Rhone's note. He contends that his promise made one month before
was without consideration and is therefore unenforceable. This is assumpsit on the indorsement, Hall contending that the indorsement was
ratified by Underwood and that no consideration beyond that received by
Rhone is necessary.
Cooke for the plaintiff.
Where the transaction is contrary only to good faith and fair dealing,
where it affects individual interests and nothing else, ratification is allowable! Shisler vs. Vandike, 92 Pa. 449.
The contract of suretyship rests necessarily upon a valuable consideration; Paul vs. Stackhouse, 38 Pa. 302.
Forsyth for the defendant.
When the endorsement of a note is forged, such endorsement cannot
be ratified by a person whose name is forged, as the act is criminal and
against public policy; Shisler vs. Vandike, 92 Pa. 447.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
PIERCE, J.:-The only question directly raised by the statement of
facts is as to the necessity of a consideration separate from that of the
note itself to bind Underwood, the defendant, on his ratification of Shoemaker's act in endorsing it in Underwood's name. That Underwood's
promise to pay the not was sufficient in other respects to constitute a
valid and binding ratification, there can be no doubt. Counsel for the
defendant, however, considered the case as involving an attempt to ratify
a forgery, and rested the defense upon that ground.
Three questions, therefore, seem to be presented for consideration:
First.-Did Shoemaker's 'act in signing Uunderwood's name as endorsee
upon the note constitute a forgery, which under the laws of Pennsylvania
cannot be ratified? Second.-If not, then can Underwood avoid liability
upon the note by pleading that his subsequent ratification of Shoemaker's
unauthorized act was without consideration? Third.-Do the provisions
of the Negotiable Instruments Act of May 16th, 1901, render such an act

THE FORUM
incapable of ratification? The two former we answer in the negative,
the latter in the affirmative.
It seems always to have been the settled law in Pennsylvania that a
forgery cannot be ratified. Garrett v. Gonter, 42 Pa. 143; McHugh v.
Schuylkill County, 67 Pa. 391; Shisler v. Vandike, 92 Pa. 449; Building
and Loan Ass'n v. Walton, 181 Pa. 201. But there is an obvious distinction between a case in which a party signs an instrument falsely representinghimself to be the person whose name he signs representing, not that
he is the party whose name he signs, but only that he has authority from
that person to sign for him; the former is a case of forgery, but the
latter is merely one involving a false representation of authority, and can
at most render the person so signing guilty of false pretense. In Tiffany on Agency, page 51, it is sbid that " * * * an act, to be capable of ratification, must be done professedly on behalf of the quasi principal, by one -who assumes to act as his agent, while in the case of
forgery, the forger does not profess to sign for the other, but, in effect,
represents the signature to have been made by the person whose signature
it purports to be." In a footnote the author quotes from the opinion of
Kelly, C. B., in Brook v. Hook, 6 Ex. 89, which appears to have involved
the precise point under discussion, wherein the same doctrine is clearly
enunciated. This same distinction is recognized in the case of Building
and Loan Ass'n v. Walton, 181 Pa. 201, cited supra. The court said:"A forger does not act on behalf of, nor profess to representthe person
whose handwriting he counterfeits, and the subsequent adoption of the
instrument cannot supply the authority which the forger did not pretend
to have."
We are therefore satisfied that, although the act of Shoemaker in signing Underwood's name to the note in question involved a
fraudulent misrepresentation of authority, yet it did not constitute a
forgery.
In many of the earlier Pennsylvania cases the policy of the law which
forbids the ratification of a forgery seems to have been given a more
extended application, and it was then held that actual and positive fraud
was of itself sufficient to vitiate the contract in toto. These cases, however, were subsequently, at least in part, overruled. The opinion of the
court in Lyon v. Phillips, 106 Pa. 57, contains a lucid statement of the distinction between the earlier and later doctrines as to the effect of fraud
in this regard, and also throws light on the question whether a new
and independent consideration is necessary to render a ratification of a
fraudulent act binding. It is said:-"Where fraud is of such a character
as to involve a public wrong or a crime, the adjustment of which public
policy forbids, the ratification of the act in which the fraud originates is
also opposed to public policy and cannot be permitted:-But as was said
in Shisler v. Vandike, 8 W. N. C. 234, "where the transaction is contrary
only to good faith and fair dealing and where it affects individual interests
and nothing else, ratification is allowable."
It ib true that in Duncan v.
McCullough, 4 S. & R. 487, which was followed by Chamberlain v. McClure,
8 W. & S. 31; Goeble's Appeal, 3 Harris [51 Pa.] 428; and Miller's Appeal,
Casey [30 Pa.] 478, it was held that "where there has been actual and
positive fraud, or the adverse party has acted mala fide, there can be no
such thing as a confirmation- What was once fraud will always be so,"
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and that "confirmation without a new consideration would be nudum
pactum." But Duncan v. McCullough, supra, so far at least as it applies
this principle to frauds affecting merely individual interests, is now, as
was said in Negley v. Lindsay, 17 P. F. S. [67 Pa.] 217, regarded as overruled in Pearsall v. Chapin, 8 Wright [44 Pa.] 9, where a different doctrine is distinctly declared." The court then reviews the subsequent
Pennsylvania decisions wherein the latter case is followed, and concludes:
-"It cannot be doubted, therefore, if there is no other defect than want
of consideration, or otherwise, there can be a ratification of a fraudulent
act which affects individual interests only, without a new consideration."
In Garrett v. Gonter, 42 Pa. 143, it appeared that one Devereux,
acting under a forged power of attorney, mortgaged certain realty belonging to Mrs. Gonter, the defendant. The court, after deciding that the
forged power of attorney could not be ratified, says:-"But she (Mrs.
Gonter) could confirm the mortgage, for that was executed in her name
by a professed agent acting under a real or pretendedauthority. To ratify that required no new consideration from the mortgagee. And if the
evidence satisfied the jury that she had ratified it, the plaintiff was entitled to recover, even though she had never signed the power of attorney.
It requires no formality to ratify what has been done in another's name,
under a professed agency. Consent to the act, approval of it, is all that
is essential."-Approved in Building and Laon Ass'n v. Walton, supra.
There seems to be nothing in the case of Shisler v. Vandike, 92 Pa.
447, relied upon by the defendant, which is at variance with
the views herein expressed. In that case as in this, the attempt was
made to hold a party whose name appeared upon a note as indorser, on
the theory that although the ostensible indorser had not himself placed
his signature thereon nor authorized anyone to do so for him, yet he had
ratified the act of his brother in signing as his agent. The courtinreversing a judgment for the plaintiff, said:-"The instruction seems to us, in
the first place, wrong in this, that we find no evidence to warrant it.
There was testimony, and abundance of it, that John. (the ostensible endorser) had authorized the putting of his name upon the paper, but none
whatever that he had subsequently ratified the endorsement, either by
word or deed." The court then proceeds:-"The question, however, remains, could the forged instrument, conceding it to be such, be ratified
and thus be made good?" We find nothinginthistowarranttheinference
that, had the testimony shown that the fraudulent endorsement had been
made by a person assuming to act as agent of the defendant, the latter
could not have ratified it and thus have become bound as endorser upon
the note.
It therefore appears that had the present action been brought before
the passage of the Act of May 16th, 1901, P. L. 199, see. 23, a recovery
must have been allowed. By that act it is provided that:-"When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain
the instrument, or to give a discharge thereof, or to enforce payment
against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is
precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority." It would
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seem that by this provision the common law distinction between the civil
effects of forgery and of fraudulent misrepresentations of agency is abrogated in Pennsylvania, and the principle which forbids the ratification
of the one applied to both indifferently. Evidently itis no longer the law
that unless the person who performs the actual manual act of signing
becomes thereby liable to a criminal prosecution, the act may be ratified.
It even seems that though there be no fraud in the transaction, that even
where the signing is done by an agent in good faith but under a mistaken
impression as to the extent of his authority, his act is nevertheless incapable of ratification. To sustain the present action it is necessary that the
plaintiff prove the defendant a "party" to the instrument, for he can be
held if at all, on the ground of ratification alone, as there is no evidence
to raise an estoppel. Nor is Underwood "precluded from setting up the
want of authority," because he expressly stated that he had not given
Shoemaker authority to sign his name, and cannot be estopped to deny
that which he never expressly or impliedly admitted.
We therefore believe that under the provisions of the act Shoemaker's
unauthorized act in signing the defendant's name to the note in question
cannot be ratified and accordingly direct
Judgement for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The note was made payable to Underwood, in order that he, or some
one for him, might endorse it for the accommodation of the maker Rhone.
Hall has discounted it. It having become due and not being paid, on demand upon Rhone, proper notice has been given to Underwood. He has
promised to pay it within a week.
Shoemaker wrote the name of Underwood. He did not, apparently,
forge it, for he was kno*n by both Rhone and Hall not to be Underwood*
and to sign the name of the latter, as agent, and he professed thus to sign it.
The case then, does not fall within the operation of the principle that a
forgery is incapable of ratification by the person whose name has been
forged.
Virtue can be given to an unauthorized act of agency, by a subsequent
ratification. This ratification consists in the intention adequately manifested by the person alleged to ratify, to be bound by the act, as if done
by himself. Underwood said that he would pay the note within a week
He thus ratified Shoemaker's act.
It is suggested that there was no consideration for the ratificationWe do not understand that there need be a consideration other than would
have been necessary for the act, had it been done directly by the ratifying
principal. The advance of money by Hall, would have been consideration
for Underwood's endorsement, had he in person made it. That advance
is sufficient to support its ratification. There was an implied contract by
Rhone with Shoemaker, as agent for Under*ood, that if Underwood
should pay the note, he, Rhone, would reimburse him. By ratifying the
endorsement, Underwood acquires the right to enforce this contract.
Underwood subsequently to the ratification, retractedit. But, retraction is -not permitted; Huff cut Agency, 1st Edit. p. 44, Jones v.Atkinson,
68 Ala. 167; Hyatt v. Clark, 118 N. Y. 563.
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The learned court below has concluded that the 23rd section of the
act of May 16th, 1901, has made the ratification ineffectual. In this, we
think, it is in error. The 19th section declares that "the signature of any
party may be made by a duly authorized agent." It adds, "No particular
form of appointment is necessary for the purpose; and the authority of
the agent may be established as in other cases of agency." In other
cases, an agent may be constituted by a ratification, as well as by a
precedent appointment. It was not the intention of the legislature to
change the law of agency as respects negotiable instruments. The 23rd
section declares that a signature is wholly inoperative, when forged or
made without authority and that no right to. enforce payment against any
party can be acquired, "unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right, is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of
authority." In Pennsylvania a ratification for forgery is void; but a ratification of an act which is not a forgery, imparts validity to it, that is,
precludes the ratifying principal from setting up the want of authority.
Judgment reversed.
BREWSTER v. BRIGHTLY.
Agency-Ratification-Reasonable 'lime.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
One Rhone, falsely pretending to be the agent of one Brewster, contracted Aug. ixth to buy one thousand bushels of wheat at 90 cents per
bushel. Brewster was not informed that the purchase had been made until
one month later. Brightly, the seller, supposed that Rhone had the authority, and in fact never discovered the contrary until the day before the date
when the wheat was deliverable under contract viz. November xI. Brewster did nothing on learning of the existence of the contract as wheat was
then selling at 87 cents per bushel.
But the day before the date of delivery when the wheat was selling at
95 cents per bushel, Brewster wrote Brightly that while he had not authorized the purchase, he had decided to ratify it and would expect the wheat to
be delivered on the day following. Brightly replied that had he known that
Brewster was not bound from the start he would have repudiated all obligation under contract many weeks before and that he had never relied at
all npon Rhone's responsibility.
Rhone was a man who had a good reputation for veracity and so was
believed by Brightly but was entirely without property. Brewster sues for
failure of Brightly to deliver the wheat.
Burgess for the plaintiff.
Ratification is equivalent to prior authority: Clark on Contracts pp. 4895o2; Tiffany on Agency, p. 47; McClintock vs. South Penn Oil Co.. 146 Pa.
144; Phil. W. & B. R. R. Co. vs. Cowell, 28 Pa. 329.

Edwards for defendant.
Ratification must be made within a reasonable time where time is of
the essence of the contract: Townsend vs. Corning, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 435;
McClintock vs. South Penn Oil Co., 146 Pa. 144, Atlee vs. Bartholomew, 69
Wis. 43; Dodge v*. Hopkins, 14 Wis. 686.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.
GRAYBILL, J.:-The relation of principal and agent may arise by
express agreement, or where one person without authority makes a contract
with a thiad person for an alleged principal who subsequently ratifies the
contract. Where an agent has exceeded his powers, or where the person is
a stranger and has assumed agency, ratification may be made by the principal
or alleged principal, by silence, as where one receives the benefits accruing
from the contract and assumes the liabilities, or by express words, or by acts
in general which clearly indicate an intention to adopt the unauthorized act
or conduct of the agent, and the ratification will relate back and be equivalent to prior authority given to the agent. Addison on Contracts, Sec. 6o,
Kelsey v. National Bank, 69 Pa. 426; Phila,, W. & R. R. Co. vs. Cowell, 28
Pa. 329.
We know of no legal duty imposed upon the plaintiff in a case like this
to notify the defendant of a disaffirmance of the agent's acts. Where a
bona fide agent exceeds his authority, the principal's silence, after being informed of the facts, if he does not disavow the agent's acts in a reasonable
time, will be presumed tc constitute ratification, but where a mere volunteer
officiously interferes in the affairs of another, the alleged principal is not
bound to give any attention to the matter. Story on Agency, 255, 258;
Foster vs. Rockwell, 104 Mass., 167; Ladd vs. Hildebrant, 27 Wis. 135.
There is no evidence in the case at bar that the plaintiff would not have
been capable of entering into such a contruct himself, or that he was not
informed of all the material facts; these being prerequisite, he was not precluded from ratifying and binding himself for these reasons: i Am. & Eng.
Enc. of Law, 1189.
Though silence may constitute ratification unde" certain circumstances,
we would hesitate to say that it did in this case, nor can it be said that it
was a disavowal. Even if it were regarded as a disavowal, the plaintiff was
not precluded from affirming or ratifying the contract subsequently, unless
before his ratification the defendant had abandoned the transaction, which
he had not done! x Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 1182. In the case of Phila.,
W. G R. R. Co. vs. Cowell, supra. where B without authority subscribed
for additional shares for C, who was then in England, and was notified by
B of what he had done, it was held that C's silence for seven years constituted ratification, and he was bound to the contract. But C permitted the
dividends from his first shares to be applied to payment of the shares purchased for him by B, and we think that was sufficient to distinguish that
case from the case at bar.
The question whether there was a ratification is sometimes a matter
for the jury, but this does not apply to this case, since the letter sent by the
plaintiff to the defendant the day before the date for delivery was an express and implicit ratification. This compels us to consider whether the
plaintiff could make a ratification at a time so comparatively late. We
know of no legal bar. If not, what would be the criterion to designate
what period of time would designate a bar? Would it be a day, or a week,
or a month? Brewster may have been under a moral obligation to notify
Brightly sooner, but he was not under a legal obligaiion to do so. He
wrote that he had decided to ratify the contract, and he may have reached
his decision long before he communicated it to the defendant, but this would
not give him a right of action,
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The learned counsel for the defendant ably contends that where the value
of property is very fluctuating, it is highly essential that an offer be accepted or
refused within a reasonably prompt time. As against the plaintiff, this was a
mere offer till he had ratified the unauthorized act of Rhone and till then it
might have been withdrawn by the defendant. Defendant's contention is a
prooff or the plaintiff, rather than against him, that he was not benefitted by
deferring his ratification until time of delivery had almost arrived. There is
no evidence that the plaintiff had any assurance that he would be profited
by the contract. The price of wheat is often very fluctuating: and the time
elapsing between the time of ratification and when it might have been delivered-a period of almost two days-was sufficient in which prices could
have fallen very much and have caused great loss to the plaintiff.
The fact that the parties do not stand on an equal footing will not prevent ratification by the party for whose benefit the act is done. The principal acquires a right to elect whether he will adopt the unauthorized act or
not, and it must be admitted that the parties do not generally stand upon
equal terms, since the principal may always elect to ratify the act if it is for
his benefit, and to disavow it if it is to his injury: Story on Agency, Sec.
248. Dodge vs. Hopkins, 14 Wis., 686, and Atlee vs. Bartholomew, 69 Wis.,
43, cases cited by the defendant's counsel, seem to be in conflict with this
doctrine. In the former case it is said: "The inaccuracy consists in not
properly distinguishing between those cases where the subsequent act of
ratification is put forth as the foundation of a right in favor of the party
who has ratified, and those where it is made the basis of a demand against
him. The principal in such a case may, by his subsequent assent, bind himself, but if the contract is executory, he cannot bind the other party. The
latter may, if he choose, avail himself of such assent against the principal,
which if he does, the contract, byvirtue of such mutual ratification, becomes
mutually obligatory." But in the case at bar we cannot say conclusively
that the ratification by the plaintiff was put forth as a"foundation of a right
in his favor," though apparently so, for we have shown that he had no assurance that the transaction would result profitably to him. Further, if the
transaction to be valid, must receive the assent of Brightly to bind him after
ratification by Brewster, there would be a time when Brewster would be
bound and Brightly would not. Such reasoning would lead us on ad infinitum, and when could a contract be completed by correspondence? "The
aggregatio mentium of the parties need not commence simultaneously. It
must co-exist; but there must be a period when the question of contract or
no contract rests on the will of one party to accept or reject a proposition
made, and this interval may be long or short:" McClintock vs. Oil Co., 146
Pa., 144.
Third parties dealing with an agent are put upon their guard by the
very fact of agency and do so at their own risk. They must, at their peril
observe that the act done by the agent is legally identical with, or included
in, the power invested by the principal. I Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 986;
Baring vs. Peirce, 5 W. & S., 548. The defendant evidently knew that
Rhone had no property, and he should also have known, if he did not, that
he was dealing with him at his peril, particularly under these circumstances,
when there was not the slightest indication of any authority, nor of any past
transactions between the plaintiff and Rhone, nor any existing relations from
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which agency might have been implied. What action the defendant would
have against Rhone need not be determined in this decision. Though the
defendant would not be required to do anything more than he had expected
to do during 4he intervening three months, yet this would not give the plaintiff right to recover.
But we have shown that the contract was capable of ratification by the
plaintiff, that he was capable of ratifying it, that he did so expressly and
definitely, that there is nothing to show that ratification should have taken
place at any other time before the date for the delivery of the wheat, that
the defendant was dealing with the agent at his peril and that he could not
retract after the plaintiff had ratified the contract, wherefore judgment is
hereby rendered for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
Rhone's transaction with Brightly, was not a contract between himself
and Brightly, and if it had been, this action is not upon such contract. The
action is upon a contract between Brewster and Brightly.
On August i ith Rhone, falsely pretending to have authority to act for
Brewster, made for Brewster what purported to be a contract with Brightly.
But as Brewster had not authorized Rhone, and had done nothing which entitled Brightly to assume that he had authorized Rhone, Brightly in fact did
not then make a contract with Brewster. He thought he did, but he in fact
did not. Brewster fell under no obligation to Brightly, by Rhone's act, and
surely he also acquired no right subsequently to consent to be under obligations to Brightly, and, at the same time, by the same act, to impose an
obligation on Brightly. A contract is between two or more persons. If
Brightly made a contract on Aug. iith, it was a unilateral contract.
The act of X which can be converted into a contract by the act of Y is
an offer. Y may convert it into a contract by an acceptance of it. If
Brewster's notice to Brightly on Nov. io,the day before the expiration of the
three months named in the negotiation between Rhone and Brightly, is
treated as an acceptance of an offer, and if that negotiation may be considered as an offer, a contract arose on Nov. ioth, not before. But had
Brightly made an offer? It does not appear that he had. The evidence
leaves it uncertain whether it was not Rhone that made the offer to him.
and whether his, Brightly's act was not an acceptance of this offer. If this is
true, by what alchemy is Brightly's acceptance to be transmuted into an
offer? Huffcut, Agency (1st edition) p. 38 indeed says "it is better to treat
the contract between the third person (Brightly) and the agent (Rhone)as in
the nature of an offer to the principal (Brewster) which the latter may accept or reject by an election operating upon the previous unauthorized acceptance by the agent." He must pardon us, if we demur. "-It is better"
etc. Better for whom? Surely it is not better for Brightly, to make what
was not his offer, into an offer, for the purpose of securing for Brewster the
power to impose an obligation on him which he did not intend to assume.
"It is better" for Brewster, doubtless, but why should the advantage of the
unbound principal be promoted at the cost of the other party?
It is better to be fair and just. Justice is one of the highest social interests. It is plainly not fair and just to artificially change the quality of the
act of a man to his detriment, in order to secure an unearned advantage to
another man.
Brightly did not intend to offer to sell wheat. He intended to accept an
offer to buy it. He intended to bind himself to sell, and to bind Brewster
to buy. What justification is there for a lawyer's or a judge's annulling his
actual intention, and feigning a different intention for reasons suggested by
a dull pedantry and an inane scholasticism? Rather, courts must see facts
and apportion rights to facts, not to fictions.
Ordinarily, an offer lapses, if it is not accepted within a reasonable time,
unless a time is specified in the offer. Had Brightly intended to make an
offer of wheat, would he have intended that it should be open for three
months? Wheat was of fluctuating market value, and a delay to accept the
offer for three months would be unreasonable. The offer would have
lapsed, and could not have been accepted on Nov. ioth. But, in order to give
Brewster an advantage, Huffcut invents a special doctrine of offer. The
ordinary offer must be accepted within a reasonable time, or it lapses, but

THEIFORUM
Huffcut suggests that this fictitious offer of Brightly, should be deemed to
be an offer which shall remain open until he recalls it!
But how could Brightly recall it? He supposed himself not to have
made an offer but a contract. He knew that he could not retire from a contract. Brewster was aware for two months that he was in this state of
of mind, but astutely refrained from disabusing him, probably for the very
purpose of preventing his attempting to withdraw the offer, if offer it was.
To adopt a policy which shall prevent this harsh aud dishonest conduct on
Brewster's part is, thinks Huffcut, to be "too refined for the necessities of
business !" Nonsense. It is not necessary for a business man, or for business, to be dishonest, and there are two business men in every transaction,
and the man that has been deceived by the pretended agent, has hih necessity as well as has the other man. He has the necessity of not being injured by the deceptton, as much as the other man has the necessity of profiting by it.
It is manifest that if there is any justification for the adoption of the
fiction that Brightly has made an offer, it should be with the qualification
which attends ordinary offers, viz: that they will lapse nnless accepted in a
reasonable time, or at least that the person for whom the pretended agent
has acted, should, as soon as he learns of the transaction, notify the other
party, in order that he may have an opportunity to stand by or to withdraw
the offer.
Thisis, in substance, the doctrine of Dodge v. Hopkins, 14 Wisc. 630.
In McClintock v. Oil Co. 146 Pa. 144, the company which had made the
contract to buy an interest in land from Mrs. McClintock through her husband, acting as agent, sent an assignment to Mrs. McClintock and her husband, to execute and they executed it. Under these circumstances, the court
held that a binding contract had arisen. The defendant actually made an
offer to take the assignment, and the vendors, the principal and her husband accepted this offer. "The defendant's consent to the contract sued
upon" says Mitchell, J. "was thus manifested, and upon acceptance by
plaintiff, the contract became binding as a common law contract of both
parties, and upon her signature it became acontract in writing within all the
requirements of the statute" of frauds. Despite dicta in this case which
are supposed to support the doctrine that one with whom an unauthorized
agent has made a contract may notwithstanding his unwillingness be bound
by the subsequent ratification of the principal, it is authority for no such
tenet.
The English view that the contract binds the third party, through it
does not bind the principal, gives to the contract an aspect which it was by
neither party to it, intended to wear. Instead of imposing an unconditional
duty on Brightly to deliver the wheat, and on Brewster to pay for it, this
view would cause it to impose on the former a conditional duty to deliver
the wheat, i. e. to deliver it if, and only if, Brewster should subsequently
require such delivery and to impose no duty whatever on Brewster. Duty
would fall on the latter only in consequence of his subsequent ratification.
This manipulation of the transaction is wholly unnecessary and inadmissible.
It violates the maxim, infictionesevjicrsubsistitaequitas. Itactomplishes
no desirable result. The doctrine is entirely convenient that if B makes a
contract with A through X who pretends to be A's agent, that contract will
impose no burdens on B, if in fact X has no authority, just as it imposes none
on A;and that, as to impose burdens on A, his future assent is necessary, so
B's future assent, after discovering X's want of authority, is necessary, in
order to impose burdens on him. The man in whose behalf a deception has
been practiced should be innobetter position than the man on whom it has
imposed.
It is suggested that in the formation of every contract, there must be
a time, however short, during which one party is bound, while the other is
not bound. That is true. But the offerer intends to allow the offeree to
bind him by an acceptance within a reasonable time, unless, before such acceptance, the offer is recalled. That a man can thus impose on himself
such a one sided obligation, when he intends to impose it, is surely a bad
reason for forcing on him an obligation still more onerous, (viz. that of performing should there be an acceptance before the offer has been recalled
at however long an interval.) when he has not intended it.
Judgment reversed.
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In this book, the profession will find merits far greater than those of
the ordinary text-book. The subject is attractive. We have had practically four constitutions in Pennsylvania, and it is thirty-four years since
the present.one went into operation. Yet up to this time no author has
attempted a treatise upon our state constitutional law. Nine years ago,
Mr. Sanderson's useful work on the Validity of Statutes appeared but it
was confined, as its title indicated, to a discussion of the constitution as
applied to statutes.
The wealth of the material exploited in the present book, will be realized when it is considered that the table of cases contains no less than
2300. The book of over 600 pages is on good paper, is clearly printed, contains verbatim the constitution, has a valuable historical introduction,
and a very satisfactory index. Its 28 chapters deal with construction,
the right of self government, liberty of conscience, trial by jury, freedom
of speech and of the press, and all the other constitutional topics.
The 3rd chapter on Liberty of Conscience shows with no less candor
than perspicacity, that, liberal, relatively, as is the constitution in
matters of religion, there still linger remnants of the ancient proscription,
though now in a mild form, by which those in power in former times
harried their dissentient subjects. A man that has no belief in God is
still incompetent to be a witness. The Sunday law is in design and effect,
a partial establishment of the Christian religion. So is the refusal of
courts to protect trusts made for the dissemination of anti-christiantenets.
The writer of these observations has read with especial satifaction
the chapter on Trial by Jury. It is remarkably clear and misses nothing
of the judicial law on the topic. It is impossible to withhold approvAl of
the author's reprehension of the doctrine that the legislature, inventing
crimes that were not such prior to 1776, may provide for their trial without a jury.
It is somewhat surprising to discover, in Chapter 2, on the right of
self government, the statement that the constitution may be altered in
four ways, only one of which, revolution, is extra-legal and therefore illegal. The 18th article of the constitution of 1874 propounds a method of
amending the instrument. That the people in enacting it, supposed that
they were furnishing the only mode by which amendments could be effected, ,can hardly be doubted, and they scarcely distinguished between
amending the constitution and creating a new one. Every constitution
since 1790 has embodied considerable portions of its predecessors. It is
very true, however, that if in some other than the constitutional way, a
new constitution is invented, and receives the adhesion of the legislature,
the executive and the courts, those who object to the ignoring in the process of the prescriptions of the existing coustitution will be compelled to
submit. An unconstitutionally adopted constitution may be forced on the
unwilling minority, as was the 14th amendment of the Federal constitution.
To conclude, we may most heartily commend to the profession of
Pennsylvania and to students of constitutional law everywhere, this
most thorough, lucid, and scholarly work.

